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Introduction1
Animal advocacy is aimed at a range of practices that cause harm to sentient non-human 
animals, for example factory farming and experimentation on animals. The central aim 
of this essay is to present and defend an approach to animal advocacy which I shall call 
“effective animal advocacy” (“EAA”).2  This approach is aligned with “effective altruism”, 
a global social movement characterised by the use of evidence and reason to discover the 
best ways to improve the world.3  Following this general principle, EAA emphasizes the 
use of the best available evidence and reason to discover the best ways of helping animals. 
The aim is to choose from available interventions such that advocates do the most good 
they can for animals. I will argue that EAA is a promising approach to animal advocacy, 
and worthy of support by animal activists. 
I will begin by proposing some key principles of effective animal advocacy and presenting 
a prima facie case for this approach. One target audience for this essay is animal advocates 
who are “on board” with the core of EAA (as proposed), but who might have reservations 
about its broadly consequentialist “flavour”. I shall therefore address a family of anti-con-
sequentialist objections to EAA. Central to my defence of EAA is the claim that it can be 
attached to various moral frameworks. In the final section I respond to a worry that this 
claim might render EAA practically useless for activists. 
The prima facie case for effective animal advocacy
For the purposes of this essay, I propose the following schema as a summary of some key 
principles of EAA:
a) Advocates aim to use evidence and reason to do the most good they can for animals. 
1 I am grateful to Dr. Greg Fried, Dr. Elisa Galgut, Professor David Benatar, Jessica du Toit, and an 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
2 I will use “activism” and “advocacy” interchangeably. I did not coin the term “effective animal 
advocacy”: references to “effective animal activism” have been made in the context of the “effective 
altruism” movement. In particular, “Animal Charity Evaluators”, a prominent charity within the “effective 
altruism” movement (and which I take as one exemplar of EAA), used to be named “Effective Animal 
Activism.” See also Luke Muehlhauser “Four Focus Areas of Effective Altruism” in Ryan Carey (ed) The 
Effective Altruism Handbook (Centre for Effective Altruism, 2015) 104: “Effective animal altruists are 
focused on reducing animal suffering in cost-effective ways.” [My emphasis].
3 Recent books on effective altruism written for a popular audience are Peter Singer The Most Good 
You Can Do (Yale University Press, 2015) and William Macaskill Doing Good Better (Random House, 
2015). 
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b) Advocates adjust their interventions based on the best available evidence for what 
works.
c) All else equal, advocates prefer measures for which there is good evidence of causal 
effectiveness. 
d) All else equal, advocates prefer the most cost-effective measures.
This schema should be seen as a starting point for analysis, and not as a complete state-
ment of EAA. I think there are at least four reasons to endorse EAA as a framework for 
animal advocacy. 
The first reason is the case from practical rationality: given a clear goal (reducing 
animal suffering), finite resources (limited money and time), and a set of possible 
interventions aimed at achieving the goal, all else equal, it is good to optimise the use 
of resources with respect to the goal. That is, it is good to choose the intervention(s) 
such that the available resources take one as far as possible towards the intended goal. 
This argument assumes (plausibly) that there are objectively better and worse ways to 
go about achieving the stated goal; and that using evidence and reason is better than al-
ternative methods for determining the better (or best) ways to achieve the goal.  In the 
context of animal activism, if there is evidence available that a particular intervention 
from a range of possibilities (“A”) helps the most animals the greatest amount per unit 
of cost, and another intervention (“B”) helps significantly fewer animals much less per 
unit of cost, choosing “B” rather than “A” is a bad decision, both practically and mor-
ally. Going with “B” rather than “A” forgoes the opportunity of reducing significantly 
more animal suffering, so is both practically not the best use of available resources to 
achieve the intended goal, and morally worse than the alternative which spares more 
suffering. Insofar as this principle of practical rationality is sound, it is plausible that 
in order to optimise, activists need to discover (using the best available evidence and 
empirical methods) the likely consequences and relative cost-effectiveness of the vari-
ous options available to them. Hence, EAA’s emphasis on evidence-based effectiveness 
seems to be consistent with practical rationality. 
The second prima facie reason in favour of evidence-based effectiveness in animal 
advocacy is that the stakes are high for animals. Take factory farming as just one ex-
ample of a human practice that causes animals to suffer. Billions of land animals are 
raised and killed for food annually,4  most of them on factory farms, and good evidence 
4 As at 2009, an estimated 56 billion land animals were killed worldwide every year for food: Ilea R.C 
“Intensive livestock farming: global trends, increased environmental concerns, and ethical solutions” 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (2009): 153-167.
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indicates that sentient factory-farmed animals experience a relatively high degree of 
suffering during their lifetimes. Those convinced that such animal suffering matters 
morally are likely to be convinced of both the relatively large scale of the problem and 
the urgency with which it should be addressed. Further, animal activists have limited 
resources with which to address the problem, a fact supported by the plausible claim 
that the cause of animals in industrial agriculture is relatively neglected and under-
funded compared to other important causes. Even within the broader field of animal 
welfare issues, relatively little funding goes to helping animals in industrial agriculture; 
rather, issues affecting domestic animals, such as cats and dogs, tend to receive dispro-
portionate attention from most animal welfare advocates and donors.5  Given the high 
stakes (the scale and urgency of the problem, combined with scarce resources) it makes 
sense for activists to do the best they can for animals with the available resources. In 
order to discover how to do this, it is necessary for them to pay careful attention to the 
best available evidence for impact and relative cost-effectiveness. 
A third reason in favour of EAA refers to EAA’s emphasis on cost-effectiveness, and 
is based on the claim that cost-effectiveness is a moral imperative in the context of 
animal advocacy. The moral importance of cost-effectiveness arises from the fact that 
cost-effectiveness varies significantly between different interventions. For (hypotheti-
cal) example, an activist who aims to reduce the suffering of chickens might choose 
to spend an entire budget on the rescue and veterinary care of a few chickens; or to 
distribute a video that causes many people to consume less chickens, such that a few 
hundred less chickens are raised on factory farms (and ultimately killed for human 
consumption). Given the variability of cost-effectiveness, moving scarce resources from 
the least effective intervention (or even the median intervention) to the most effective 
would produce many more times the benefit for animals. Ignoring cost-effectiveness 
in animal advocacy could therefore mean losing a significant portion of the value of a 
budget allocated to addressing (for example) factory farming; and failure to prioritise 
interventions could plausibly mean a significant number of additional deaths (or units 
of additional suffering, however measured) of animals that would not have otherwise 
occurred. If this is correct, then not only does it make sense as a matter of practical 
rationality to help more animals (and by a greater amount) instead of fewer animals (by 
a lesser amount); it is also morally problematic not to do so.6  In addition, there may 
be special motivations to be as effective as possible in the context of animal activism, 
5 William Macaskill (2015) “The truth about animal charities, cats and dogs” The Guardian (19 
November 2015).
6 This point is made in the context of global health in Toby Ord (2014) “The moral imperative towards 
cost-effectiveness” (Centre for Effective Altruism, 2014).
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compared to other important causes focused on benefiting people. Since people are 
generally able to make progress and improve their situations on their own, but animals 
cannot improve their situations without activist intervention, there may be a special re-
sponsibility on animal activists to do the most good they can for animals, compared to 
doing the most good in the context of global health, or alleviating poverty, for example.
It might be objected that effectiveness is often difficult to measure; therefore it should 
not be prioritised as a standard for assessing interventions. However, the validity of 
the principle of effectiveness (viz all else equal, it is better to produce a larger benefit to 
animals than a smaller one) must be distinguished from the question of how to mea-
sure effectiveness. It might be hard to decide which intervention is best (in the sense 
of “most effective”), but the principle that activists should aim to discover which are 
best and favour the best interventions remains plausible. It is better to work on improv-
ing ways of measuring effectiveness rather than abandoning effectiveness as a strategy 
(provided of course that the problem of measurement is tractable).7
A fourth and final prima facie reason in favour of EAA is as follows: there is currently a 
large range of possible interventions against practices that cause animal suffering. For 
example, advocacy against factory farming ranges from legislative advocacy, to special 
issue welfare campaigns, to pro-vegan advocacy, to maintaining animal sanctuaries, 
to corporate outreach, to undercover investigations, to litigation against corporations 
enforcing animal welfare laws. Given such a wide range of viable options, it makes 
sense to have some standard for prioritising interventions. EAA provides a reasonable 
standard of prioritisation: given a set of alternatives, prioritise those for which there is 
the best available evidence of positive impact for animals, and which are relatively cost-
effective.
In response to this suggestion, some might worry that prioritising in this way risks 
excluding some potentially effective interventions, or alienating some activists inclined 
by training or temperament to non-prioritised kinds of actions by explicitly regard-
ing their favoured activities as less worthwhile.  What is required at this stage, some 
might argue, is innovation and a diversity of approaches. This is a fair point. Indeed, 
given that empirical research on effectiveness in animal advocacy is currently relatively 
underdeveloped, it is plausible that it will often be inconclusive what the most effective 
intervention is. It is also plausible that a diversity of approaches is helpful. However, 
7 A similar point is made in the context of effective altruism more generally by Katja Grace “Estimation 
Is the Best We Have” in Ryan Carey (ed) The Effective Altruism Handbook (Centre for Effective Altruism, 
2015) 40.
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this does not mean that we should reject the ideal of testing interventions such that 
the most effective are prioritised. Where possible, we should prioritise interventions 
based on evidence of effectiveness; but where this is not possible, we should try new 
things (perhaps based on intuition or other non-evidence-based factors) with the 
aim of ultimately testing them for effectiveness. Moreover, we should not abandon 
evidence and reason altogether when generating and trying new interventions: given 
empirical uncertainty about effectiveness, activists should try new interventions that 
are plausible, or most likely to be effective, given the available evidence; provided that 
there are no good reasons to think a particular intervention will be counterproductive. 
 
Anti-consequentialism
EAA prioritises evidence-based impact for animals and asks advocates to do the most 
good they can for animals. In this, EAA is broadly consequentialist in “flavour”. How-
ever, recall that my proposed schema of EAA should be understood as an incomplete 
statement of EAA, which could be completed in various ways. The schema does not 
depend upon or imply any particular moral theory. Accordingly, those who endorse 
EAA need not be committed to strict consequentialism viz the claim that the effects 
of measures for animals are the only considerations relevant to activism on animal-
related issues. Taking consequences seriously (in the sense of stressing the importance 
of cause-effect thinking in advocacy and acknowledging that advocacy measures have 
impacts for animals that must be considered in order to choose responsibly between 
advocacy measures) is distinct from strict consequentialism. So too is prioritizing the 
impacts of a measure on animals when evaluating the measure. Insofar as EAA takes 
impacts seriously, or even prioritises impacts, it is not necessarily (strictly) consequen-
tialist. It does not preclude non-consequential considerations. Since utilitarianism is a 
form of (strict) consequentialism, proponents of EAA are not necessarily committed 
to (any form of) utilitarianism. I do not take a stand on (a) whether EAA is (strictly) 
consequentialist or not, or (b) whether, if consequentialist, EAA is utilitarian or not, 
or c) if utilitarian, how to categorise EAA vis a vis different forms of utilitarianism. 
Nevertheless, EAA clearly takes the consequences of interventions for animals seri-
ously, and (I suggest) EAA prioritises impact for animals over other considerations. 
Although I do not aim to be exhaustive, here I consider some potential objections to 
EAA’s emphasis on consequences for animals. These objections can broadly be classed 
as anti-consequentialist objections, and most were originally framed as objections 
against utilitarianism.
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Too demanding?
It might be argued that EAA demands too much of advocates relative to other ap-
proaches, in recommending that advocates do as much good as possible for animals. 
For example, potentially less demanding approaches might include those that recom-
mend that advocates “do some good” or “do what’s easiest” or “focus on those nearest 
and dearest to them” or “focus on the issues they most care about and are especially 
motivated to address.” 
There are a number of plausible responses to this objection. First, since EAA is not 
committed to consequentialism, nor to utilitarianism, EAA need not require advocacy 
efforts to be maximally effective.8  EAA could be interpreted as claiming that, all else 
equal, efforts which are likely to have a greater impact are better (and to be preferred) 
for those concerned to help animals. This seems reasonable and not “too demanding”. 
  
Second, even if EAA is interpreted as utilitarian in the sense of requiring that advo-
cates “do the most good they can” for animals (and as discouraging efforts which do 
not meet this standard), this need not imply that EAA is unreasonably demanding. 
Although it is an objection to classic utilitarianism that it requires people to maximise 
utility when it would seem intuitive that this is not a requirement, but a moral option 
(neither required nor prohibited), utilitarians have given various plausible responses.
Some have denied that demandingness is a sufficient reason for rejecting utilitarian-
ism and affirmed that utilitarianism imposes demanding but reasonable obligations.9  
More generally, an appeal to a common moral view (that “doing the most good” is too 
demanding) cannot be decisive: history is full of examples of common moral views, 
which were shown to be false by philosophical argument and evidence.
8 I am not taking a stand on (a) whether EAA is utilitarian or (b) if so, what form of utilitarianism it 
takes. Therefore, I am not taking a stand on whether EAA should be interpreted as requiring “satisficing” 
rather than maximising utility for animals (promoting measures that yield “good enough” consequences 
for animals, even if not “the most good you can do”). Note, however, that if EAA were formulated as 
requiring “satisficing” rather than maximising benefits for animals (or minimizing suffering), then it 
would be less demanding and may seem correspondingly more reasonable. Alternatively, EAA could 
be interpreted as requiring that i) measures have “enough of an impact” (above a threshold of impact) 
and that (ii) from the set of measures that cross the threshold, the highest-impact measures should be 
pursued. This may also seem less demanding and more reasonable than a straightforward “maximising” 
requirement.
9 For example, Peter Unger Living High and Letting Die (Oxford University Press, 1996).
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Others have taken a pluralist approach, tempering consequentialist with non-conse-
quentialist considerations.10  Still others have sought to modify consequentialism such 
that it generates less demanding obligations. For example, on a “satisficing” view of 
consequentialism, rather than a maximising view, it is not morally wrong to fail to “do 
the most good” if one does “enough good.”11  Alternatively, according to progressive 
consequentialism, a right action is one with consequences that improve the world, such 
that moral agents are required to act in such a way as to increase value in the world (i.e. 
to leave the world better than we found it).12 
Clearly there are various routes utilitarian EAAs could take to the conclusion that 
EAA is not unreasonably demanding. In particular, they could argue that it need not 
be morally wrong to fail to “do the most good” for animals. For example, both satisfic-
ing and progressive consequentialisms imply that, in the context of animal activism, 
activists may devote some resources to measures that do not maximise overall benefits 
for animals. There are of course various objections and responses to each of the above 
arguments. The point is that utilitarian EAAs can mount plausible responses to the “too 
demanding” objection, such that the objection is not fatal to EAA as an approach. Since 
EAAs need not be utilitarians, it is even easier for non-utilitarian EAAs to withstand 
the “too demanding” objection.   
Could EAA require injustice?
A disadvantage of classic utilitarianism is that it is possible that an action which maxi-
mises overall utility requires the agent to violate individual rights or otherwise do 
something morally repugnant. For example, utilitarianism can yield the morally re-
pugnant conclusion that an innocent person should be framed and punished in order 
to avoid the greater evil of mob violence.13  Suitably constructed, other examples show 
that there are some circumstances in which the utilitarian answer to what one ought to 
do (in the example) involves the morally repugnant violation of individual rights. 
10 For a particularly clear example of such a pluralist approach, see Jonathan Glover Causing Death and 
Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
11 See Michael Slote and Philip Pettit “Satisficing Consequentialism” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volumes Vol. 58 (1984) 139-163; 165-176. For recent objections see Ben Bradley 
“Against Satisficing Consequentialism” Utilitas 18(2) (2006): 97-108.
12 Robert Elliot and Dale Jamieson “Progressive Consequentialism” Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 23 
(2009) 241-251 at 244-245.
13 Smart, JJC & Williams, Bernard Utilitarianism: for and against (Cambridge University Press, 1973) 69-
70, citing HJ McCloskey “A note on utilitarian punishment” Mind 72 (1963) 599.
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EAA is not necessarily utilitarian, let alone consequentialist; but it could nevertheless 
be objected that EAA might sometimes require (or permit) advocates to commit analo-
gous injustices. For example, it might be the case that promoting “humane” meat as an 
alternative to factory-farmed meat violates the rights of humanely reared animals not 
to be killed and used for food, even if doing so is “for the greater good” of animals.14  
This would be the case if the measure significantly decreases demand for factory 
farmed animal products but new humanely reared animals are brought into exis-
tence and killed as a result of the measure. Here we have a possible situation of EAA 
requiring injustice. There does seem to be something objectionable about sacrificing 
some “happy” animals for the “greater good”, since it is repugnant that some “happy” 
animals are raised and killed as a result of the measure. 
In response, I do not think this possibility is fatal to EAA. There are a number of 
plausible defences. A defender of EAA committed to consequentialism could “bite 
the bullet” and accept that such measures are justified as the “lesser of two evils.”15  
Although it is repugnant that some “happy” animals will be raised and killed as a 
result of the measure (and a proponent of EAA is likely to be unhappy about this), 
this may be more than offset by the reduction in the number of animals raised and 
killed (in worse conditions) in factory farms; in which case the measure is plausibly 
justified. This judgment can be supported by noticing that the anti-consequentialist 
conclusion is comparably unpalatable: namely, that in some circumstances, non-
consequentialist considerations of justice dictate that one must choose “the greater 
misery…perhaps the very much greater misery…”16  This seems to me to be a com-
parable injustice, such that the anti-consequentialist alternative is no less likely to 
require injustices. This response might satisfy many, but those with strong deonto-
logical commitments are likely to be unconvinced.
Given this, there are possible responses for a defender of EAA who remains commit-
ted to consequentialism, but does not agree that sacrificing some animals for the sake 
14 This example assumes that such animals have these rights, which is controversial. I do not take a stand 
on this here.
15 See for example JJC Smart Utilitarianism 71.
16 Ibid. 72.
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of the greater good is acceptable.17 One option would be to take an agent-relative ap-
proach to consequentialism, which would be consistent with the judgment that sac-
rificing some for the greater good is not acceptable.  On an agent-neutral approach, 
the world with the sacrifice of “happy” animals is compared with the world without 
such sacrifice, from the point of view of an objective observer. If the world with the 
sacrifice is better overall for animals from this point of view, then consequentialism 
requires activists to make the sacrifice, despite its moral repugnancy. However, on an 
agent-relative account, it could be legitimate for an observer to judge that the world 
with the sacrifice is better (since it contains fewer killings of animals overall), while it 
is also legitimate for the activist(s) making the decision (the agents) to judge that the 
world with the sacrifice is worse (because their actions lead to the killing of “happy” 
animals). On this view of consequentialism, an act is morally wrong if and only if the 
act’s consequences include less overall value from the perspective of the agent. Thus, 
if the world with the sacrifice is worse from the perspective of the activists, agent-rel-
ative consequentialism implies that it would be wrong for activists to promote mea-
sures which lead to the sacrifice of some “happy” animals for the “greater good” of 
animals. The point is that it is possible for a proponent of EAA to be consequentialist 
and still resist the conclusion that such sacrifices are acceptable. 
I have not taken a stand on whether EAA is committed to consequentialism. Indeed, 
proponents of EAA could be, but need not be, consequentialists. Given this, another 
response becomes available. A supporter of EAA might respond that, although EAA 
prioritises consequences for animals over other considerations, non-consequentialist 
considerations “kick in” at a certain point. One of these points might be where a 
particular measure involves the sacrifice of some animals for the greater good of 
animals overall. If so, it could plausibly be argued that advocates should generally “do 
the most good” for animals, but not use any measures that are likely to directly result 
in new animals being raised and killed for food, even if such measures yield the best 
overall benefits for such animals. Specifically, it would follow that EAAs should not 
promote “humane” meat or “conscientious omnivorism” as an alternative to factory-
farmed meat, even if doing so yields significant net benefits to animals. I would be 
happy with this conclusion, since I think that raising and killing even “happy” ani-
mals is wrong and should not be promoted.
17 For general discussion of agent-relative consequentialism, see Douglas Portmore “Can 
consequentialism be reconciled with our common-sense moral intuitions?” Philosophical Studies Vol. 
91 (1998) 1-19; Douglas Portmore “Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent-Relative?” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 38(4) (2001) 363-377; Douglas Portmore “Position-Relative Consequentialism, 
Agent-Centred Options, and Supererogation” Ethics Vol. 113 (2003) 303-332.
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In sum, it is not clear to what extent EAA would recommend measures which require 
significant injustices (as an empirical matter); at least, there is insufficient evidence 
to support the view that EAA requires injustices as a matter of course. Nevertheless, 
it remains a possibility that EAA might require injustices, and this is objectionable. 
However, I have argued that this possibility is not fatal to EAA, since plausible re-
sponses can be given, whether EAA is committed to consequentialism or not. 
Could EAA require violence?
Unlike animal abolitionism, which categorically rejects the use of violence, it is not 
clear whether proponents of EAA would endorse violence in certain circumstances.18 
 
In the absence of a categorical prohibition, it is possible that EAA is consistent with the 
use of mild forms of violence (such as damage to property on factory farms) if this is 
inter alia likely to significantly help animals and be relatively cost-effective. Whether 
this is the case depends in part on how violence is understood. There are good reasons 
to condemn violence understood narrowly as intentional harm to life and limb, or 
threats of such harm (including intimidation or harassment). The reason is that such 
violence imposes direct and significant harms on persons and so are prima facie mor-
ally prohibited, according to all plausible ethical theories. It is less obvious that violence 
understood as, say, damage to property or economic sabotage of factory farms should 
be categorically rejected, especially if it prevents significant harms to animals (a mor-
ally worthy goal). 
Let us assume for the purposes of argument a rather broad definition of violence, 
which includes not only direct physical violence against life and limb (including threats 
of such violence), but also intentional attacks on property, either to cause economic 
damage or to instil fear, or both. Given this broad definition, it is possible that some 
activism against factory farming counts as “violent”. For example, “open rescues” or 
undercover investigations might be accompanied by damage to property on factory 
farms.19  Even so, such violence by animal advocates seems to be rare. In particular, it is 
important to note that the more severe forms of violence (threats of severe violence, in-
timidation, harassment) are rarely practiced by animal advocates; rather, they seem to 
be a hallmark of a small group of extremist activists against vivisection. Further, insofar 
18 For a statement of animal abolitionism see for example Gary Francione Animals as Persons (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).
19 See for example Pelle Strindlund “Butchers’ knives into pruning hooks: civil disobedience for animals” 
in Peter Singer (ed) In Defense of Animals: the Second Wave (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006) 167-173.
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as animal advocates damage property, it is plausible that most actual acts of damage to 
property by these activists are not primarily intended to instil fear, but rather to prevent 
harm to animals (by sabotaging equipment used to inflict harm, or by disrupting the 
ordinary business activities of enterprises that harm animals). So as an empirical mat-
ter, it seems that violence (broadly construed) by animal advocates is rare. 
I am not aware of any evidence-based evaluations of the use of violence. It is plausible 
that uses of violence (such as attacks on property) are generally likely to be ineffective 
in helping animals because i) they make animal advocates appear radical and therefore 
deter potential supporters or ii) they invite backlash by, for example, factory farmers 
and lawmakers; or iii) insofar as they are illegal and attract legal sanctions, they are not 
likely to be relatively cost-effective. However, these are speculations; and it remains 
nevertheless possible that EAA might be consistent with violence in particular cases, 
where there is some evidence that it is relatively cost-effective and likely to have overall 
benefits for animals. 
Given this possibility, the responses by defenders of EAA would be similar to those 
against the claim that EAA might require injustices. A defender of EAA could “bite 
the bullet” and accept that violent measures are justified as the “lesser of two evils.” 
Although it is repugnant that some property damage occurs, this might be more than 
offset by animal lives saved or the reduction in suffering of animals, in which case the 
use of violence is plausibly justified. This is supported by the following thought: assum-
ing that animal advocates do not engage in severe forms of violence such as threats, 
intimidation, harassment, or direct physical violence against people, economic damage 
to the animal industry (caused by property damage) could plausibly be outweighed by 
protections of the vital interests of animals not to suffer and to continue to live.
Alternatively, since EAA does not preclude non-consequentialist factors, a supporter 
of EAA might respond that a non-consequentialist principle of non-violence trumps 
evidence of impact (where these conflict).  If so, EAAs could consistently argue that 
advocates should generally “do the most good” for animals, but not use violence, even 
if violence yields the best overall benefits for such animals in a particular case. The 
theoretical possibility of the use of violence by proponents of EAA is not fatal to EAA 
as a general approach to animal advocacy. 
Moral theory and practical guidance for animal advocates
My responses to anti-consequentialist objections depend in part on the claim that EAA 
can be separated from classical consequentialism (and more generally that it can be 
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attached to many moral frameworks). It might be objected that this leaves EAA practi-
cally useless for activists, because EAA cannot yield practical recommendations until it 
is settled which moral framework it should be attached to.20 
In response, I think it is plausible that EAA can give practical guidance to activists 
without first settling the moral framework question.21  This is because I think EAA will 
often recommend similar methods regardless of the moral framework to which it is 
attached. Although there would of course be some differences, there would be sufficient 
overlap in practical recommendations to provide useful guidance. 
Take for example a specific recommendation to activists against factory farming 
which (I suggest) flows from EAA: advocates should focus on getting consumers to 
first reduce their consumption of chickens, then caged eggs, and then pigs. Some farm 
animals are kept in considerably worse conditions than others: quantitative estimates 
of farm animal welfare in the United States suggest that the worst-off farmed animals 
are broiler chickens, layer hens and pigs.22  Given this, and considering the amount of 
harm done per meal or per calorie consumed (for example, more chickens are killed in 
the typical American diet than beef cows or dairy cows, because chickens are so much 
smaller), it is plausible that the most effective way to cut animal suffering out of one’s 
diet is to stop eating chicken, then eggs, then pork, since this reduces the worst suffer-
ing for the most animals for the longest time.23  Other practical recommendations flow-
ing from EAA might include the use of evidence-based and cost-effective leafleting, 
online advertiements and undercover videos to get consumers to cease or reduce their 
consumption of factory-farmed animal products. 
These practical recommendations seem consistent with a commitment to consequen-
tialism, at least insofar as they are thought to have the best consequences for factory-
farmed animals. They are also plausibly consistent with broadly deontological com-
mitments. For example, Gary Francione’s animal abolitionism is based on the right of 
sentient animals not to be used by humans as mere property.24  In practice abolition-
20 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
21 I also suspect EAA could generate useful recommendations for activists without being attached to any 
moral  framework at all; though I do not pursue this line of inquiry here.
22 Norwood & Lusk Compassion, by the Pound: the Economics of Farm Animal Welfare (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 227-229.
23 William Macaskill (2015) “Why eating eggs causes more suffering than eating beef ” Vox (31 July 2015).
24 Gary Francione Animals as Persons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
Volume 18, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
14 | eP1578 Essays in Philosophy
ism recommends nonviolent grassroots vegan advocacy and education. The extent to 
which the above EAA-based recommendations in fact support the eventual abolition 
of human uses of animals as mere property is an empirical matter which I do not have 
the space to address adequately here. Nevertheless, the practical guidance from EAA is 
plausibly  consistent with the deontological commitments of abolitionists, at least inso-
far as there is evidence that these methods promote the right of sentient animals not to 
be used as property, as well as the eventual abolition of such uses. 
Finally, the EAA-based recommendations seem consistent with the virtue ethics per-
spective. From this perspective, the virtuous activist against factory farming would 
presumably be motivated by benevolence towards animals, and be genuinely concerned 
with improving their lot. Plausibly, this foundational virtue is consistent with being dis-
posed to reduce the suffering of factory-farmed animals as effectively as possible using 
evidence and reason; and therefore consistent with EAA’s recommended methods.  
If it is true that EAA will often recommend similar methods regardless of which moral 
framework it is attached to (as suggested by the above illustrations) then EAA can be 
useful to activists notwithstanding that it can be attached to many moral frameworks 
(and in particular can be divorced from consequentialism).
Conclusion
I have presented “effective animal advocacy” as a reasonable approach to advocacy for 
those motivated to help animals, and defended it against objections. If my arguments 
are reasonable, the upshot is that animal activists have good reasons to align themselves 
with the EAA framework. In particular, they have good reasons to aim to do the most 
good they can for animals. Practically, in the context of activism against factory farm-
ing for example, this would include pursuing pro-vegan campaigns and doing so as 
effectively as possible, by way of (inter alia) evidence-based and cost-effective leafleting, 
online advertisements and undercover videos. 
 
